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COMMENT:

VIETNAM AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Anthony A. D'Amato*

With each international crisis inevitably come the selfstyled "realists" proclaiming that there is no such thing as
public international law. The Vietnam war is no exception,
although here, due to the unusual complexity of the facts and
the controversy over the applicable rules of international law,
many of the published replies to the "realist's" positions have
themselves been insubstantial and unconvincing. Let us look
first, briefly, at the arguments of one of the realists, and
then, with equal brevity, at some of the counterclaims. The
remainder of this comment will be addressed to the larger
issues involved and some suggested avenues for coping with
the implementation of the ldeal of world peace through world
law.
Mr. Joseph K. Andonian's impatience with those who would
apply international norms to the Vietnam situation probably
represents the views of a majority of successful domestic
American lawyers. He claims in an article entitled Law and
Vietnam that lawyers "make a mockery of law" when they
"indulge in the pretense that the question of our involvement
Andonian asserts
in Vietnam is a conventional legal matter.11I
that since there is no binding, enforceable, customary international law governing the Vietnam conflict, lawyers should not
pretent otherwise. Such pretense confuses the public and
denigrates the idea of the rule of law. Rather, Mr. Andonian
argues, lawyers should expend their efforts to help bring about
a sense of "community" in international relations by promoting
increases in travel, trade, communications, and a sense of
commitment to the world community. With the advent of this
commitment, we may expect to see the gradual creation of an
international legislature, an organized judicial system
employing compulsory jurisdiction, and an international police
force to back up the legislature and judiciary. Only then, he
concludes, can lawyers meaningfully discuss questions of international law.
Mr. Andonian's article was in reaction to some prior publications assessing the legality under international law of the
American position in Vietnam, One of these earlier publications
was a brief by the self-appointed "Lawyer's Committee on
*Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
154 A.BoA.J. 457, 458 (1968).
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American Policy Towards Vietnam" inserted in the Congressional
Record by Senator Wayne Morse. 2 The second was a State
Department memorandum asserting the legality of the American
involvement. 3 Both of these documents are highly unsatisfactory, even as polemical papers. The State Department memorandum asserts many facts without convincing proof, facts that
subsequently have been challenged in Congress and elsewhere.
The Lawyer's Committee paper is even less effective, not so
much for its factual assertions as for its shotgun series of
legal arguments, obviously assembled in great haste by those
having little training in international law. One may sympathize with Mr. Andonian's "realism" when confronted by papers
such as these which have had wide readership and have been
discussed extensively.
A considerable improvement in the quality of legal
analysis is afforded by a recent collection of articles published by the American Society of International Law under the
editorship of Professor Richard A. Falk. 4 Apparently, Mr.
Andonian had not seen this book while writing his article.
Even so, the effect of the book is bewildering. Some of the
23 articles and 11 appendices help define certain issues of
the war more clearly, but on the whole the collection is a
confused mass of phrases such as "self-defense," "nonintervention," "armed attack," and "indirect aggression."
Plowing through the 633 pages of this book is like hacking
through a jungle in Vietnam without leaving behind a clear
trail for others to follow.
Yet can we conclude from these efforts that there is no
applicable international law on Vietnam, that there is no
consensus as to legal rules of conduct in that admittedly
complex and difficult arena? Is it not overly facile to say,
as does Mr. Andonian, that lawyers should divert their efforts
to promoting a sense of community in international relations
so that eventually a world government can emerge and the rule
of law will be triumphant? While efforts made along these
lines are unobjectionable, they are truly utopian. We shall
most likely be completely annihilated by thermonuclear war,
(rhe major powers at present have over sixty tons of nuclear
explosives for every man, woman, and child alive today) than
first achieve world government. The current urban crises in
the United States will soon spread to racially inflammatory
southern Africa, to vast areas of poverty in Latin America, and
to overcrowded conditions in Asia; new "Vietnams" in different
2 American

Policy Vis-a-Vis Vietnam, Memorandum of Law,
112 Cong. Rec. 2552 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
354 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474-89 (1966).
4 The Vietnam
War and International Law (1968).
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contexts may arise with increasing frequency in the 1970's
These problems will not be avoided by a preand 19801s.
mature world government to which no nation, least of all the
United States, wants to entrust its sovereign rights. But a
greater attention to international law, as it has thus far
developed, might help avoid major-power military involvement
in these forthcoming crises.
We should not sell the rule of law short. Despite our
frustration at the quality of the debates on the legality of
American involvement in Vietnam, we should remember that with
better effort and with the utilization of more scientific
techniques in the determination of present international law,
a consensus might have been found with respect to Vietnam and
can be found in future situations like Vietnam. What kinds of
efforts and techniques are possible? Let us briefly consider
some of them,
A Universal Language
The mass media have recently given considerable attention
to the work in linguistics of Professor Noam Chomsky and his
colleagues at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor
Chomsky has argued in a series of books and articles that there
are certain underlying regularities in grammatical structure
and syntax among what would otherwise appear as highly dissimilar languages -- primitive languages, Oriental languages,
Romance languages, and others. 5 His studies open up the
fascinating possibility that human communication may be to
some extent innate, that languages are not just learned at random but reflect inborn regularities of the mind. By elaborate
mathematical computations, it is becoming possible to discern
a universal language or syntactical structure that may
eventually facilitate human understanding and communication.
If we move from languages in general to a particular
kind of language -- the language of law -- it is possible to
find even more striking regularities. For hundreds of years,
nations in their international diplomatic discourse have
resorted to essentially the same language -- that of interInternational law
national law -- in their state papers.
itself, as Professor H.LoA. Hart has argued, involves the free
transfer of techniques of domestic lawyers to the international
arena. 6 Chance alone cannot account for the fact of the
5

See, e.g., Chomsky, Formal Properties of Grammars,
et al., HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 323
(1963), and bibliography therein.
6 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209-30 (1961);
see D'Amato,
"The Neo-Positivist Concept of International Law," 59 AM.
J. INT. L. 321 (1965).
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utility of international legal discourse for so long a period
rather, there must be an underlying universal
of time;
language of legal discourse which, with appropriate modifications and translations, serves a highly useful diplomatic

purpose.
International law is basically a language. It is a way
of communicating policies, positions (both geographicalboundary positions and claims to increased jurisdiction),
and intentions from one country to another. Lawyers of all
countries and backgrounds seem to understand international
law after only a brief training in its special techniques.
These lawyers are in highly placed political positions, and,
when they are called upon by statesmen to give their advice,
they exert considerable influence in national policies. It
is international law, ultimately, that determines what a
nation's boundaries are, what rights it has in the seas and
in the airspace, what rights it has over visiting foreigners
within its territory, and what its rights and duties are
toward foreign countries and territories. This complex
system of international legal rights and duties effectively
limits and directs the behavior of most nations most of the
time, as Professor Henkin has accurately observed. 7 When
disputes arise, statesmen consult the language of international law to determine their nation's legal positions,
though eventual settlement of the dispute may be based on
considerations other than international law.
Few readers perhaps will disagree with what has been
said so far, but the implications of what has not been said
are probably more controversial. International law has not
been discussed in terms of legislatures, courts and sanctions.
This kind of creative and enforcement machinery is of course
an important component of domestic systems of law, but in
international law a central legislature does not exist and
international courts lack the power to enforce their
decisions. Is international law therefore something "less"
than "law"? Professor Fisher has pointed out that domestic
constitutional law cannot be "enforced" against the government in the traditional sense, and even a decision in the
Court of Claims cannot be enforced against a Congress or a
President unwilling to meet its obligations. 8 It is very
hard to "enforce" a legal decision against an abstract
entity such as a state or a government, yet these entities
7Henkin,

International Law and the Behavior of Nations,
114 RECUEIL DES COURS 171, 179 (1965).
8 Fisher, Bringing
Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1130 (1961).
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have an important stake in the rule of law, if only for their
own selfLpreservation. But even apart from Professor Fisher's
arguments, it is somewhat irrelevant to ask whether international law is "law" in the true sense (as Mr. Andonian asks
in his article). The fact is that, whatever it may be called,
international legal communication is a highly useful device
for diplomatic accomodation short of violence among nations.
In the development of this legal language, lawyers have
an extremely important role to play. Indeed, they have a
duty to continue to apply legal language to international
problems as well as to local problems. At the very least,
some order may be introduced into the otherwise chaotic state
of propaganda and emotional claims that can harden nations'
positions and make war more likely.

The Question of Substance
Regularities of communication and discourse do not, of
course, amount to a consensus as to any given legal dispute.
We cannot expect everyone with legal training to look at
the Vietnamese situation and come up with the same conclusion.
It is unrealistic in the extreme to expect international law
to have built-in answers to large political questions such as
the legality of American intervention in Vietnam or even the
legality of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam.
At the same time, it is not very sensible to expect to
find the answer to any international dispute in the vague
phrases of text-writers or in the generalities of the United
Nations Charter or other treaties. Debate as to the "real
meaning" of these large phrases and concepts is truly
illusory.
Rather, three distinct steps are necessary to tackle
a large question such as the legality of the American commitment in Vietnam. The first two are the traditional tasks
of a well-trained lawyer; the last is a more ambitious and
difficult program:
(1) The problem should be broken down into a number of
relatively small and manageable categories. We cannot be
concerned with the legality of the American commitment in
Vietnam in the abstract, as Mr. Andonian implies we are.
Rather, there are numerous smaller questions which in turn
may provide a conclusion for the larger issue. For example,
questions involving issues such as the specific intent of
articles in the 1954 Geneva Accords, the use of napalm and
gases in warfare (including the question of their use as
reprisals), the treatment of prisoners of war, the extension
of the war to civilians (and how to define nonparticipants
in such a situation), the Tonkin episode, the 1967 elections
104

in South Vietnam (role of the Buddhists, the government op9
position, etc.), and many more.
(2) Once the categories are established and the relevant
questions posited, there is the clear necessity of establishing
what the facts of the situation are. Much of the "legal" debate
on Vietnam is no more than controversy as to the facts in dispute. Some kind of impartial determination of the underlying
facts is a clear prerequisite to applying "law" to any situation.
A board, a jury, or a panel of lawyers might well attempt to
make an impartial inquiry into the many facts of the historical
record of Vietnam; short of this, it is unfair to blame "international law" for failing to resolve such a dispute where the
facts have not been established.
(3) The basic problem then is reduced to the determination
of the applicable rules of international law. First, where
are these rules to be foUnd? Not in the writings of scholars,
for at best these can only point to better sources. Nevertheless, much of the unsatisfactory debate on Vietnam seems
to stop at the textbook level. How about the decisions of
international tribunals? The difficulty here is that the
decisions are few and far between. Rather, the lawyer-scholar
should turn to the actual evidence of the language of international law itself--the diplomatic correspondence of nations
and the debates of national representatives in the United
Nations, the O.A.S., and other international organizations.
In these voluminous sources may be found claims and counterclaims, concessions and resolutions, disagreements on some
issues and agreements on many others. This is the raw
material of international law, but it lies largely untapped.
New social science techniques of content analysis and
the new information-retrieval computers can make this vast
body of evidence of international law more available than
in the past. Nonparametric statistical tests such as multiple
regression analysis and factor analysis can give relatively
precise weights to the evidence of legal rules thus uncovered.
Standards of relevance and analogy can be set up, tested for
statistical significance, and applied to the legal rules. A
huge amount of diplomatic discourse and internationalorganization argumentation has been devoted to questions of
indirect aggression, rules of warfare, and other situations
directly applicable to the problem in Vietnam, but this information must be systematized and categorized before it can be
useful.
The task is an immense one, but not at all impossible.
It is certainly an impossible task for one researcher, which
9Cf. BEAL & D'AMATO (eds.), THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM (1968).
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may be a good reason why writers on international law perfer
rehashing the stale generalizations of text-writers rather
than the arduous examination of the real sources of international law. But we cannot really afford the individual
fragmentation of efforts in which the traditional practitioners
delight. For the result all too clearly justifies the pessimistic conclusions of Mr. Andonian and other writers who
find the debates on Vietnam so unproductive.
For the United States government to undertake a serious
task-force study of the raw material of international law
relevant to situations such as Vietnam, an initial expenditure
of one million dollars would not be at all unreasonable.
Particularly in light of the applicability of the findings of
such research to future "Vietnams" which the United States

Government, according to all current indications, is quite
anxious to avoid, such expenditures might be the only
practical way of deriving utility from the rich body of
international legal materials. It is doubtful that the government can be moved to make such an expenditure for a research
team and for the relevant-computer hardward, though the government's own published statistics reveal that it costs this
country over one million dollars to kill a single vietcong
soldier.
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